Nash

Results: 2621



#Item
261Finding all Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game David Avis McGill University

Finding all Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game David Avis McGill University

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2009-04-11 07:09:06
262Reprinted from

Reprinted from "A History of Scientific Computing," Stephen G. Nash, editor, pp. © 1990 ACM Press (Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.) by permission. Reprinted from "A History of Scientific Computing,"

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Source URL: history.siam.org

Language: English - Date: 2006-02-03 11:00:48
263Least-Squares Regret and Partially Strategic Players Chlump Chatkupt A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Least-Squares Regret and Partially Strategic Players Chlump Chatkupt A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English
264Microsoft Word - vg_paper_updated_3_18_16_Charlie_Monday_march_14_3pm.doc

Microsoft Word - vg_paper_updated_3_18_16_Charlie_Monday_march_14_3pm.doc

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Source URL: www.econ.vt.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-15 08:28:35
265Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games Bernhard von Stengel ETH Z¨ urich November 25, 1996 (minor corrections added November 11, 1997)

Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games Bernhard von Stengel ETH Z¨ urich November 25, 1996 (minor corrections added November 11, 1997)

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-03 13:36:02
266Motivation Model Is every code a Nash code?

Motivation Model Is every code a Nash code?

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English
267PROOFS OF APPENDIX A Proof of PROPOSITION A1 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PUparticipation game without allied voters): The proof is a straightforward probabilistic extension of Palfrey and Rosenthal (19

PROOFS OF APPENDIX A Proof of PROPOSITION A1 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PUparticipation game without allied voters): The proof is a straightforward probabilistic extension of Palfrey and Rosenthal (19

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Source URL: www1.feb.uva.nl

Language: English - Date: 2007-10-30 09:26:57
    268Analysis of a forwarding game without payments George Karakostas McMaster University Abstract—We consider a forwarding game on directed graphs

    Analysis of a forwarding game without payments George Karakostas McMaster University Abstract—We consider a forwarding game on directed graphs

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    Source URL: www.cas.mcmaster.ca

    Language: English - Date: 2014-12-11 18:58:13
    269Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗ David K. Levine‡

    Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗ David K. Levine‡

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    Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2016-03-12 03:25:53
    270Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:

    Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:

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    Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk

    Language: English - Date: 2004-08-30 10:00:02